On the issue of the principle of the presumption of innocence in disciplinary proceedings

Abstract

The article is devoted to a detailed analysis of national practice of disciplinary proceedings against judges, prosecutors and lawyers, as well as the legal positions of higher courts on the fact of the presence or absence of the principle of presumption of innocence in this category of proceedings. Particular attention is paid to the study of international law and thematic case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which highlights the distinction between criminal and disciplinary proceedings on certain characteristics and features of the principle of proof of guilt in each of them. The article formulates a claim conclusion about the need to rethink the essence of disciplinary proceedings in national law and to extend the basic principles of justice (in particular, criminal) to its sphere.
The practice of prosecuting lawyers for disciplinary misconduct can serve as an example of a diametrically opposed approach to understanding the nature of disciplinary proceedings. Іn this case such features of justice (criminal and disciplinary proceedings) as competition, equality of the parties before the law and the court, proving the guilt of a person “beyond a reasonable doubt”, objectivity, justice and others are clearly demonstrated. Therefore, establishing the absence of the principle of presumption of innocence against judges and prosecutors as representatives of public authorities can be regarded not only as a manifestation of their discrimination in relevant disciplinary proceedings, but also as a violation of fundamental principles and constitutional rights of the person in the process of bringing them to this type of justice.