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STRATEGIC AUTONOMY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ON THE WAY TO "EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY" IN DEFENSE?

2019 marked 20 years since EU Member States decided to create a joint EU approach to security and defense. The paper raises the question on finding new approaches to provide security and defense in Europe in the current context, as well as the formation of a new paradigm for research on regional security in Europe. Traditional approaches to the study of European integration (neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism) are of little use for theorizing the development of European defense in conditions of new challenges and threats to national and regional security, as well as transatlantic solidarity violations. The article studies European Strategic Autonomy (ESA), which refers to the ability of the European Union, in conjunction with Member States, to independently determine its own priorities according to which to take decisions and implement them in the fields of foreign policy, security and defense. ESA is not synonymous with independence, nor does it deny membership in military-political alliances, since a more realistic scenario implies positioning itself as a European pillar of NATO. The implementation of the idea of building a «european sovereignty» in the field of security and defense implies that the European Union should take bigger responsibility for its own security, the security of its neighbors, and should strengthen its role in transatlantic relations without opposing NATO. In order to move from rhetoric to concrete policy steps, the EU needs to develop a plan of measures for political, institutional and industrial action. It means that achieving real autonomy requires time and joint efforts by EU institutions and Member State governments. However, political and institutional autonomy can be built exclusively within the whole Union, while military-industrial autonomy can be initiated and implemented by a group of the most economically and technologically advanced EU Member States.

Keywords: strategic autonomy; sovereignty; defense; security policy; EU Global Strategy; European Union; NATO; member state.

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Стратегічна автономія Європейського Союзу: на шляху до «європейського суверенітету» в обороні?

У 2019 р. виповнилося 20 років, відколи держави-члени ЄС вирішили виробити спільний підхід у сфері безпеки та оборони. Автори порушують питання щодо пошуку нових підходів до забезпечення безпеки і оборони в Європі в сучасних умовах, а також формування нової парадигми досліджень проблем забезпечення регіональної безпеки в Європі. Традиційні підходи до дослідження європейської інтеграції (неофункціоналізм та міжурядовий підхід) малопридатні для теоретизації розвитку європейської оборони в умовах нових викликів і загроз національній та регіональній безпеці, а також порушення трансатлантичної солідарності.

Проаналізована Європейська стратегічна автономія, під якою розуміється можливість Європейського Союзу спільно з державами-членами самостійно визначати власні пріоритети, відповідно до яких приймати рішення і реалізовувати їх в сфері зовнішньої політики, безпеки і оборони. Європейська стратегічна автономія не є синонімом незалежності, як і не означає відмову від членства у військово-політичних альянсах, оскільки більш реалістичний сценарій передбачає її позиціювання як європейського стовпа в НАТО. Реалізація ідеї побудови «європейського суверенітету» в сфері безпеки і оборони передбачає, що Європейський Союз має взяти на себе більшу відповідальність за власну безпеку, безпеку своїх сусідів, а також посилити свою роль у трансатлантичних відносинах, не протиставляючи себе НАТО. Для того, щоб перейти від риторики до конкретних політичних кроків, ЄС має розробити план заходів щодо діяльності в політичному, інституційному і промисловому вимірах. Це означає, що досягнення реальної автономії вимагає часу і спільних зусиль інститутів ЄС та урядів держав-членів. При цьому політична і інституційна автономія може бути побудова виключно в межах всього Союзу, тоді як військово-промислова автономія може бути ініційована і реалізована групою найбільш економічно й технологічно розвинутих держав-членів ЄС.

Ключові слова: стратегічна автономія; суверенітет; оборона; політика безпеки; Глобальна стратегія ЄС; Європейський Союз; НАТО; держава-член.

Introduction. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the termination of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the entry of the former socialist countries of Europe into NATO and the EU created a sense of security in the EU member states due to the absence of a real opponent. However, the tone of discussions on European security and defense has changed significantly over the last thirty years. It is due to the fact that instead of the destroyed bipolar balance around which the European security architecture was built, unipolarity as a new model of global political order is being set. However, this model did not last long and ceased to exist in 2008, when the Russian-Georgian conflict testified to the revival of Russia's imperial ambitions.

The beginning of the XXI century was marked by new global challenges that caused doubts on the effectiveness of not only existing international mechanisms of cooperation and dialogue, but also of the international law order itself. Old conflicts are "waking up", new ones are being born, new destabilizing tendencies are being declared. As a result, the current system of international relations is becoming more uncertain and less stable. As a consequence, European states are increasingly feeling their own vulnerability to external pressure, which makes them to strive for the preservation of sovereignty, which is increasingly becoming an abstract concept in seventy years of integration.

The need for the European Union to set up its own collective security system outside NATO is growing, first and foremost, due to the deteriorating security situation at its borders due to the policy of Russia and other countries that challenge the EU's ability to defend its interests and values. Over the last decade, unrest in Europe's periphery has risen to the top of the EU security agenda. W. Oosterveld and B. Torossia note that the conflicts that were set in motion in the Middle East and North Africa region in late 2010 reverberated across the Mediterranean, leading to waves of migrants, an increased threat of terrorism, and economic disruption [31]. Recognition of this situation was recorded in Commission President J.-C. Juncker's

Political Guidelines [24] in 2014 and stated in his State of the Union Speech [40] of 14 September 2016. The increasingly unpredictable foreign and security policy of the United States[1] ready to exploit the dependence of the European Union and its neighbors from NATO, and indeed from the United States in order to achieve short-term geopolitical goals also encourages the EU to formulate its own defense policy. Without addressing this vulnerability, both at Union level and at individual Member States level, Europe can cease to be a player of the new world order and may become a chessboard on which the great powers will compete for power in the region [27].

Analysis of recent literary studies. Until recently, surprisingly little attention has been paid in the current scientific literature to the formulation of a European security and defense policy [22], the creation of a European army and defining of the role of the USA in security in Europe. The failed attempt to create a European defense community, the recognition of NATO as a key player in European security architecture of the Cold War era, the subsequent US-led unipolar world model setting, led to a lack of intent on the leadership of the European Union to cover the field of security and defense by integration initiatives.

Changes in international and regional security sphere in the 21st Century pushed the EU to introduce the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) as a new policy direction. CSDP has undergone significant development in recent years, thanks to the Lisbon Treaty novels[2]. In December 2013 and June 2015, the European Council decided to further developing the CSDP, improving the overall defense capability of the EU Member States, and the need to enhance the global competitiveness of the European industry and the security and defense market.

Discussions on the strategic autonomy initiative for the EU have caused active discussions among Europeans and the US on the possibility of establishing a «european sovereignty» in defense. However, taking into account the non-essential time elapsed since the initiation of strategic autonomy and the uncertainty of its content (it is accepted that there is no more misleading phrase than "European army", cause it is traditionally associated with the process of completing the federalization of Europe) among the researches the predominantly ones are analytical reviews on this issue [18; 3; 12; 2; 19].

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[1] The post-World War II European collective security system was built on the promise of the US to protect its allies. In return for such U.S. obligations allies have accepted America's dominant role in the international system. The statements of President D. Trump are a cause for concern of European leaders, as US commitments to Europe are no longer seen as unconditional but determined by the actions of European governments.

[2] The Lisbon Treaty expanded the scope of the EU's military missions and possible EU CSDP actions, namely humanitarian and rescue operations, conflict prevention and peace supporting, military intervention to resolve conflicts, including peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilization including joint disarmament operations; included reservations on mutual assistance and solidarity (in the event of a terrorist attack); provided for the possibility of creating within the CSDP groups of interested countries, which should involve in the process of implementation of joint initiatives of other EU Member States [8].

Purpose of the study. The purpose of the study is an analysis of European defense policy at a stage of closer integration within the EU, which should lead to the formation of strategic autonomy of the Union without breaking ties with NATO. The realization of this task will in the future be of decisive importance both for the further formation of the Common Security and Defense Policy and for its impact on the EU's key partners and its environment. The aim of the research done in that paper is to study the current state of the common foreign and security policy of the EU and the actual problems of its formation, the solution of which by the European Union will be decisive for the further formation of the CSDP and for the nature of the impact of the CSDP on the international environment of the EU and its international partners.

The main body of the article.

The historical development of defense policy in a united Europe: lessons and achievements.

The architecture of the defense policy of a united Europe is largely conditioned by the historical conditions that preceded its formation. At the stage of the prehistory of the European integration process, the idea of military-political integration was at the core of the vast majority of unification projects in Europe. This is due to the fact that, since the Middle Ages, Europe has been forced to fight against outside enemies, and also to seek ways for securing intra-European peace, which required the unification of European Christian monarchies [22]. However, despite the obvious need to create a defense union of European states, it is still that way of integration that has traditionally been hampered by national governments.

The explanation of this fact lies in the role that the army plays in state-building processes. We should agree with F. Gaub, who believes that the army is much more than just a social agent: the military is effectively a nation and state-builder, a school for the nation and the cradle of the state. The army has traditionally played an important role in the formation of national identity and solidarity. The main feature of sustainable state-building is the monopoly of the use of force. The armed forces, more than any other institution, represent not only the state, but rather the connection between the state and its citizens [20, p. 16–17]. Taking into account such role of the army, national governments are deliberately hampering (obstructing) the process of military-political integration, as they fear that the creation of a European army and the formation of a unified defense policy will result in the loss of sovereignty.

The situation changed somewhat after the Second World War, when the question on the relation of sovereignty and sovereign rights and the possibility of delegation of the latter to the supranational level moved from the sphere of scientific discussions to the sphere of real politics [5; 45]. The first and the closest attempt to launch military-political integration was the development and signing of a European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) (such as the European Communities – the ECSC, EEC and Euratom). This initiative was supported by the USA, which considered EDC as a tool for reintegrating West Germany [10, p. 73–79]. However, because of France's

position (Paris was frightened by the loss of sovereignty as a result of the delegation to the supranational level of sovereign rights in the field of security and defense to the supranational level, the EDC Treaty prevented France from creating its own nuclear weapon, without which its return to the "Great States Club" was a problem) the chance of creation a European defense community was lost [44]. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that even if the EDC was ratified, the real independence of the "European Army" would be insignificant, since it had to join NATO troops and to obey The Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The need to involve West Germany in Euro-Atlantic cooperation has prompted the USA and Western European countries to seek a solution to the current situation. The compromise was reached thanks to the signing on October 23, 1954, of the Paris Agreements, which provided for the abolition of the occupation regime in FRG; the creation of the Western European Union by the United Kingdom of Great Britain, France, Italy, the Benelux and FRG on the basis of the amended Brussels Pact of 1948; ensured FRG's accession to NATO.

Achieving autonomy in the military-technological sphere as a prerequisite for ensuring European sovereignty in defense.

In R. Kline's interpretation, "the power of the state = (population + territory + + economy + military power) × (strategy + political will) [7]. According to this formula, "military power" is one of the defining elements of strength. In the Cold War confrontation conditions, Western Europe's security was ensured through NATO's collective security system.

It should be noted that from the very beginning of NATO's functioning there has been a practice according to which the USA part in the organization's budget was the largest[1]. The disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies is not a bug of the system. This immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of a major power conflict in Europe. The liberal world order we know today unites Europe under the U.S.'s protection. American hegemony serves to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe's internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe has become the world's leading exporter of violence [16].

As it is well known, arms trade is not only of defensive and economic, but also of significant geopolitical importance. After the Second World War, the defense industry of continental Europe countries was virtually destroyed. In the case of West Germany, the victorious states exported equipment, scientific and technical personnel, and imposed a ban on arms production. As a result, Western European countries have ceased to be self-sufficient in the production of weapons and military equipment and manning their own armies. The European military-industrial complex has lost its position on the international arms market. It significantly weakened the economic and geopolitical position of Western European countries in the international arena. In fact, it was about the threat of these countries losing their "technological

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[1] In 2019, the US contribution to NATO's budget was 22%.

sovereignty" because of too much dependence on outside technology[1]. In its turn, exports of weapons, military technology and military and dual-use services in the conditions of geopolitical instability have gained serious economic effect for the USA, allowing it to maintain and / or to enlarge its geopolitical influence in Europe. In fact, the USA has never denied the fact that the production and export of weapons and military equipment has a significant political component [1].

Exports of weapons and military equipment have anchored for a long period of time European importers to the United States, since it also included the maintenance and further modernization of weapons and military equipment, the supply of ammunition and spare parts. As a result of the collapse of the USSR and the world socialist system of the Baltic, Eastern and Southern European countries, which opted for NATO and EU accession, as well as the countries of Western and Central Europe after World War II, they chose primarily US military corporations as partners for rearming their own armies. As a consequence, EU Member States have in fact been dependent on the US not only in matters of their own security and defense (The US military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble [16]), but also in matters of military technical equipment.

Despite some technological dependency, the modern European military-industrial complex shows rather effective models of development. The main vector for the development of the defense industry of the EU Member States is the intensification of integration processes. Creating a European integration defense-industrial complex that will replace national arms manufacturers – is a distant prospect, since there is no single military-industrial policy in the EU. However, the European Union will strive for military-industrial autonomy without which operational and political autonomy cannot be ensured [18].

As prof. S. Kielmansegg, this led to a long-lasting split between military and political/economic integration in Europe. The European Communities remained strictly limited to the latter, while military integration was exclusively a matter of NATO [25]. That is still the reason why in the beginning of the XXI century the European Union has finally resorted to formulating its own defense policy, and problems have arisen.

European defense in crisis.

There is a paradox: European Union Member States that won a Cold War against the USSR as part of NATO are now forced to state a defense deficit (a similar situation was experienced by the European Communities in early 1990, which was one of the reasons for the creation of the European Union [29]). This deficit originates in the fragmentation of European defense between the 27 national policies in that field, whose qualitative condition does not correspond to the modern needs of defense and the conduct of an expeditionary war [26].

Forming a common European defense policy in today's context requires an answer on number of fundamental questions: is it the time for EU Member States to

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[1] The EU was forced to return to the problem of securing "technological sovereignty" at the beginning of the 21st century. See: [27].

relinquish sovereign rights in defense and security to the EU? How should the EU's defense policy be in line with NATO's defense policy in the future? Can the Union's policy in this area be autonomous without undermining the integrity of NATO or duplicating its functions? Will European defense be based on mutual solidarity, on temporary coalitions or on bilateral cooperation with the USA? Should EU defense structures be integrated into Euro-Atlantic security structures? The mentioned and other related issues and are on the agenda of political and scientific discussions, both within and outside the EU [6; 41].

At the beginning of the XXI century it is obvious that the interpenetration of European states has created strong incentives for state actors to coordinate their foreign and defense policies at EU level [28]. In addition, thanks to the Atlantic Alliance integrated structures and the growth of multinational interventions since the end of the Cold War, West European armed forces are increasingly looking like multinational corporations: they operate on a global theater; their manpower is international in outlook; and their governing structures are often similar [30]. Article 24 (1) of the Treaty on European Union (2009) permits the creation of policies that could lead to a European Army. In the case of armed aggression against one Member State (Article 42 (7)) calls for a collective defense where Member States are required to assist each other by all means in their power [8]. However, NATO remains the main guarantor of the security of EU Member States.

The fact is that without USA security guarantees, a united Europe could face the risk of splitting into different camps. This is especially true of those Member States (above all, the Baltic States and the former post-socialist countries of Eastern and Southern Europe), who feel the most vulnerable to the threat from Russia and do not trust the EU's ability to establish an autonomous effective collective security system. Consequently, in the case of a transatlantic solidarity weakening, these EU Member States may be tempted to conclude bilateral treaties with the USA in the field of security and defense, which will undermine the Union's efforts to secure its strategic autonomy.

The European defense crisis has another aspect. According to French President E. Macron, "European freedom of action, the defense and security of Europe, cannot be based on a purely military approach. ... We must, at European level, master our maritime, energy and digital infrastructures" [37]. France, (and it is supported by many Member States in that case), wants to remain fully sovereign and «it must guarantee us control of our destiny». At the same time, the assertion of sovereignty should be complemented by the promotion of multilateralism, the development of strategic partnerships and the search for European autonomy [37]. Although the President of France, like the leaders of some other Member States, believes that maintaining national sovereignty and at the same time creating of European strategic autonomy is not at all mutually exclusive, it is quite problematic in fact.

Despite the position of individual Member States, the need for closer integration of Member States in the defense field is still objective [39]:

– by pooling resources, individual Member States can achieve greater output and develop defense technology and equipment (also referred to as "capability") that may not be feasible on their own;

– increased collaboration reduces duplications, promotes standardization of equipment and ensures better interoperability between European armed forces.

The mentioned gives hope that the process of forming EU strategic autonomy will continue.

A stronger Europe – a global strategy for the European Union's security policy.

The characteristics of the development of a common EU defense policy will be incomplete unless we turn to the analysis of the new EU foreign and security policy, presented on 28 June 2016 by EU High commissioner for foreign and security policy F. Mogherini and named as EU Global Strategy "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe", EUGS [13]. Before the presentation the EU was guided by the European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better Word" (2003) (after the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, the European Council, although adopted the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy "Providing Security in a Changing World" [35] but failed to adopt the new strategy).

Wagner W. and Anholt R. note that one of the most striking differences between the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and the European Security Strategy of 2003 is the ubiquity of resilience as a new leitmotif. The legislation term was completely absent in the 2003 document, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 mentions it no less than 40 times. It puts «resilient/resilience» ahead of «human rights» (mentioned 31 times), «democratic/democracy/democratization» (23 times), and «human security» (4 times) [43]. Such a change in emphasis was primarily caused by the wave of crises in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan and terrorist attacks in Europe, which meant the end of a relatively long period of peace and stability.

There is a link between the two strategies: the Global Strategy develops the regulations of the European Security Strategy. If the European Security Strategy stated that «security is a precondition of development», then the EU Global Strategy conceives of development as a root cause of resilience. At the same, the development policy to be better "aligned with our strategic priorities". The "resilience" category can be understood differently, including as a call for more defense spending. In any case, "resilience" comes across as "positive", focusing on solutions rather than problems, and as forward-looking, rather than backward-looking and negative like "fragility" [43].

A new security strategy emerged when the European Union began to realize more that Europe's dependence on US defense, first and foremost on a "nuclear umbrella", actually looks absurd. Defense spending by EU member states is second only to the USA (the EU's defense budget is almost four times larger than Russia's). United Europe ranks second in terms of its defense industry and research base. In addition, one of the EU members is France as nuclear power (before the Brexit

there were two them: United Kingdom and France whose combined nuclear arsenals provide an adequate response to hypothetical external threats).

The EU Global Strategy (EUGS) is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its geographical scope and thematic priorities. However, the EU cannot devote equal attention to all aspects of the EUGS [36]. In December 2016, the European Commission's developed "The European Defense Action Plan" (EDAP) [38], which grounds on the EU's interests, principles and priorities mentioned in the Strategy.

EDAP includes main elements:

– new political goals and ambitious tasks for Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security and defense;

– new financial instruments aimed at helping Member States and the European defense industry strengthen their defense capability;

– concrete measures for the development of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration, which identify areas of cooperation.

All of these three elements together form a comprehensive package of measures aimed at strengthening the security of the Union and its citizens [42].

The plan's developers realize the fact that the European Union is not self-sufficient in terms of security and defense. Although the EU is the second (after the United States) consumer of weapons in the world, due to fragmentation of efforts by Member States, the Union remains dependent on the United States for security and defense. The decline in European national defense budgets after the end of the Cold War has had a negative impact on the EU's ability to act as an effective guarantor of not only global but even regional security. If the United States, China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are modernizing their defense industries on an unprecedented scale, than EU Member States have reduced their defense spending by almost 12% in real terms over the last decade. Experts stress that the reduction in national defense spending is not offset by greater European cooperation. Europe suffers from cost inefficiency through duplication, the lack of interoperability, technological gaps, etc. [14]. In the absence of its own armed forces, the EU is forced to rely on the resources of the Member States, whose level of fighting capacity does not allow them to solve these problems, both individually [17] and jointly in carrying out their respective security and defense tasks. Pacifism as a basic principle of foreign policy led to the helplessness of the EU, which in the 21st century faced with the increasing number of various challenges to the security of the region, which in its turn led to a weak position of the EU in its relations with big states.

Europeans' desire to reduce their dependence on the USA in security and defense is becoming imperative today, primarily because of the unpredictable policy of the D. Trump Presidential Administration. A key idea of the EU's Global Strategy is to realize that a united Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. It is not yet about creating a European army, since then defense policy is being denationalized. Significantly, even within NATO framework, this task was failed to be solved. The strategies emphasize, firstly, on the need for EU Member States to provide technological, industrial and military capabilities for security

insurance in the region and, secondly, to create a stable, innovative and competitive defense industry as a prerequisite for achieving EU Strategic Autonomy and an effective Common Security and Defense Policy.

The European Defense Action Plan should not be seen as a step towards the creation of a European army (although some authors consider such a perspective [3]), it will not even lead to duplication of command structures, since they exist solely at Member State and NATO level. EDAP is only aimed at creating the conditions for greater defense cooperation in order to enlarge the production amount and efficiency of defense spending, as well as to ensure the increase of the competitiveness and innovation orientation of the defense industry of the EU Member States. Such task ("the creation of a powerful European defense industry") was set out in Art. 11 of the Global Strategy. The implementation of these plans would require the Member States of the Union to significantly increase their defense spending – not at a fraction of a percent, but at times, since it is necessary to fill up for the gap that has arisen over decades of underfunding of the defense and security sectors. To protect Europe today, EU Member States must increase defense spending and «increase their security and defense capabilities» (Article 44 the Global Strategy).

The Global Strategy only mentions in general terms that it is necessary to invest in the development of intelligence, drones and satellite surveillance, better border control, enhancing cyber defense capabilities, and «a full range of capabilities on land, air and sea» (Article 45). The need to increase the interoperability of EU Member States troops through training, to manage with «procedural, financial and political obstacles hindering the deployment of combat groups» of the EU is mentioned (Article 47) [42].

Relations between the European Union and NATO in the context of discussing the possibility of creating EU strategic autonomy in the field of security and defense.

The European Union is a secondary security and defense entity in comparison to NATO. The EU's common security and defense policy is aimed primarily at preventing crises outside Europe, not at ensuring the territorial defense of the Union itself. The thesis about the creation of a pan-European army is considered in an expert and academic society as "an idea without details", since the goals of its creation, command structure, financing mechanisms and a number of other factors are not defined. In addition, many in Europe believe that even if the old antagonisms between European states have disappeared, it does not mean that it is easier for them to agree to leadership in the Union of one of the Member States than to the leadership of the USA. US hegemony has long been a «sweet slavery», more acceptable to Europeans thanks to the conditional assumption that Europe will be hopelessly vulnerable without US military protection. US nuclear safeguards remain to be the foundation of protecting Europe from the only big military threat from Russia [4], since the question of the readiness of the United Kingdom and France to offer other EU Member States their own nuclear umbrella has never been discussed

in public instead of its US analogue, as well as the issue on other Member States agreement on such replacement.

One of the main goals of Global Strategy is to obtain strategic autonomy on security issues by the European Union. Although the debate on EU strategic autonomy began in the late twentieth century[1]. neither in the Union itself, nor in the US do not fully understand its significance. In discussing this category, the emphasis has traditionally been made on the need to strengthen the EU's position in relation to the ever-increasing US hegemonic role within NATO, as well as due to Brexit and the uncertainty of US security guarantees in the current context [21].

The Global Strategy focuses on the need to strengthen the EU's role as a "global security provider" (Article 3), to increase the EU's contribution to the security of the region insurance and the world at large (Article 5), and to be more responsible for developments in the world (Article 18). It is obvious that only by uniting forces EU members would have sufficient weight and potential to ensure their own security and make a significant contribution to the world (Article 16).

To achieve these EU objectives, a comprehensive approach to security and defense needs to be maintained: diplomatic, humanitarian, trade and other tools, apart from purely security and defense, need to be mobilized to manage with security concerns. The EU must also ensure coordination between internal and external instruments, as internal and external security borders are being increasingly blurred [42].

The implementation of the EU's strategic autonomy idea in the field of security and defense is quite a difficult challenge. It is due to the fact that there are quite different national models of strategic autonomy of EU Member States in relation with the USA, as well as a model of strategic partnership with the United States. Thus, France, within the framework of a defense policy that wants to be autonomous within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, seeks to not depend on the American ally at least for some of its defense supplies. As a result, France has developed its Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB) with the objective of developing its strategic autonomy. The United Kingdom, by contrast, works within a framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The models of Italy and Germany strategic autonomy set both cooperation with the USA and cooperation with other leading EU Member States [9]. The need for the introduction of a national model of strategic autonomy is caused by the fact that the US DTIB and EU DTIB link has an impact that is contradictory: the more the United States and the European Union countries will share the same foreign policy goals, the more favourable the outcome will be. In the event of a disagreement between the United States and the European Union, the record will become negative and it will be necessary not to depend on the military capabilities of the United States [9].

It should be noted that not only the US but also individual EU Member States have been restrained from considering the creation of an autonomous EU defense

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[1] Even at the Franco-British summit in St Malo (1998), London and Paris agreed that the EU "must have the capacity to act autonomously, with reliance on the armed forces and the means to use them, or be prepared to use them in response to international crises".

capability. Traditionally, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Baltic States and Poland show a negative attitude towards this idea. They believe that transatlantic relations are the foundation which European regional and global security should be built on. We should admit that in general, vision of US priorities for the presidency of D. Trump and a united Europe for the European army and defense is diverging.

The problem of strategic autonomy achieving by European Union in Brexit conditions.

Brexit seems to solve some problems – after the referendum, official London does not block Brussels' integration initiatives in the security and defense sphere. At the same time, Brexit makes new challenges for the Union to achieve strategic autonomy in the security and defense sphere. The fact is that the United Kingdom was one of the few EU Member States with full military and defense-industrial capabilities. As a result of Brexit, the EU is losing up to 20% of its military and 40% of its defense and industrial capabilities, which will significantly undermine its ability to influence security and defense, not only in Europe itself but also in neighboring regions. There are, therefore, well-founded fears that Brexit will seriously harm inter-sectoral defense research and industrial cooperation, which means that the EU is seeking to strengthen its position in these areas. It also remains unclear on what legal basis the Union's cooperation in the sphere of European security and defense with the United Kingdom and Norway may in the future.

Differentiated integration within PESCO – convergence in EU defense.

The EU Treaty provides for the possibility of introducing permanent structural cooperation, which is a form of advanced cooperation of the EU Member States in the field of defense. The Treaty on European Union (Article 46) outlines the legal framework for such cooperation. In June 2017, the EU Council decided to create a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (in fact, it is about creating a permanent headquarters for EU overseas missions) as part of EU Military Staff – EUMS. On November 13, 2017, the Foreign Ministers of twenty-three EU Member States signed a declaration of intent to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the defense sphere[1]. Thus, the opportunities provided for in the Lisbon Treaty were put into practice for the first time. At the same time, European leaders have once again stressed that European defense must be developed in a way that does not compete with NATO, but complement it.

PESCO is an ambitious, binding and inclusive legal framework for joint investment in security and defense sphere. Initiatives that are mandatory for the participants include regular increases in defense spending in real terms. The first 17 PESCO projects were adopted by the EU Council on 6 March 2018 [32].

On 6 March 2018, the EU Council approved the PESCO implementation roadmap, which sets out the strategic direction of further joint work in the field of security and defense, and provides for a compulsory procedure for national

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[1] This was the first formal step towards the official launch of PESCO. As a result, 25 of the 28 EU Member States have joined this format of defense cooperation. The UK, Denmark and Malta did not support the initiative [33].

implementation plans evaluating by EU Member States and timelines for possible future projects.

Each Member State participating in PESCO shall provide a plan of national contributions and efforts agreed upon. These national implementation plans are subject to regular evaluation by the European Defense Agency and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The latter is substantially different from the voluntary approach that is currently the rule under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy. Such an approach is aimed at strengthening the EU's strategic autonomy. The military capabilities created in PESCO framework remain at the disposal of EU Member States, which can also use them in cooperation with NATO or the UN. In that way, national sovereignty in the field of defense remains intact and, at the same time, must serve as the basis for joint efforts by States in the sphere of defense and security.

While assessing PESCO, we can conclude that the introduction of such a format for EU Member States cooperation is an example of the idea of creating a partially independent from NATO collective security system within the Union, which should enhance the role of integration in the pan-European security architecture.

In June 2018, the European Parliament and the Council adopted a regulation initiated by the Commission establishing the European Defense Industrial Development Program (EDIDP). The program envisages an investment of – 500 million over two years to co-finance the support of the EU's competitiveness and innovation potential in the defense industry [34].

Providing co-operation in the field of armaments within the EU is not an easy task. Cooperation in armament programs can face divergent corporate industrial interests if it does not lead to industrial mergers. In addition, for sovereign and security-related reasons, states are hesitant on sharing defense technologies that have been developed with national resources. It took the European Commission, together with EU member states, for almost twenty years to create a harmonized legal framework within which defense companies would evolve, industrial consolidation would take place, and a European defense equipment market would be created [9].

However, it is still that step by the EU that has received a negative assessment from the D. Trump administration. The USA believes that the Union's defense plans are threatening decades of integration of the transatlantic defense industry and military cooperation within NATO, and could potentially revive the confrontational discussions on European defense initiatives that dominated in US-European relations 15 years ago.

In May 2019, the United States sent a letter to Federica Mogherini containing veiled threats about the possibility of applying political and economic sanctions to Brussels if it did not abandon its intention to develop its own weapons projects. Washington welcomes increased defense spending, but strongly opposes the EU's strategic independence [11].

The US opposes the creation of the European Defense Fund and the allocation of EUR 13 000 million for the period 2021-2027, as well as against PESCO, within

which the EU Member States began developing 34 weapons projects. Washington criticized provisions which allow non-EU companies to participate in defense projects, but demanding that the intellectual property of the project is exclusively European and those norms which do not allow third countries, especially the United States, to control exports of the weapons created. The rule that participation in PESCO projects is subject to unanimous approval by EU Member States is also criticized, cause it could hypothetically prevent US companies from participating in them. In fact, the US is considering the first steps in European defense policy as a potential threat to its dominance in both the European and third-country markets.

It is obvious, that the EU's ability to act as an independent subject which is able to influencing peace and security insurance in the region and in the world as a whole depends on its ability to act independently, regardless of the capabilities of third parties, primarily the United States. That, in turn, depends on the ability to develop European defense industrial policy. This task cannot be accomplished without reaching a state where the links between US DTIB and EU DTIB are mutually beneficial. It requires the fulfillment of two conditions [9]:

– That the rules governing relations between the US and EU DTIBs are based on the principle of reciprocity and the equivalent regulations on US and EU DTIB's.

– That the rules governing relations between the US and EU DTIB are defined in the context of a dialogue between the European Union and the United States and not bilaterally between each European country and the United States.

The High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with the support of the Commission, has initiated the creation of the European Peace Facility – a new extrabudgetary fund aimed at significantly strengthening the Union's ability to finance operational activities under the Common Foreign and Security Policy which have military or defense consequences, that means they cannot be funded from the EU budget. The European Peace Fund will allow the EU to be much more effective in deploying military missions and to support Union partners in resolving common security problems.

In 2018, summarizing the work on the implementation of the Global Security and Defense Strategy, the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary-General of NATO signed a Joint Declaration giving a high mark to the EU's security and defense efforts, which were not only NATO's alternative, but only complements its activities [23]. Appreciating the current state of relations (emphasis is placed on stepping up cooperation, in particular on maritime security, combating hybrid threats and counter-terrorism, as well as the European refugee and migrant crisis), the EU and NATO at the same time stressed the need to give new impetus and new essence to the partnership between organizations whose security is interconnected. Only together they are able to effectively provide security both within Europe and beyond. Such partnership should be based on shared values in a spirit of complete mutual openness and in accordance with the decision-making autonomy of each organization and without damage to the specificity of the security and defense policies of any of its members.

Conclusions. For almost seventy years, Europeans have become accustomed to the fact that the US has provided European security with its "nuclear umbrella" and unrivalled global army. However, at the beginning of the XXI century, Europeans whose policies after the Cold War led to gradually dismantled of their armies and to the lack of a capable security strategy are increasingly concerned about their own security because of doubts about NATO's commitment to the transatlantic partnership. It is pushing the European Union and its Member States to rethink the current collective security mechanism and to develop new additional defense programs aimed at enhancing their strategic autonomy. It should be borne in mind that the development of European Defense is a symptom, but not a cause, of the transformation of the state and of the European Union as a whole.

Searching and developing new approaches to military cooperation between EU Member States is useful as it helps to shape a new, more effective regional model of collective security. However, its implementation will be problematic as long as EU Member States seek to retain their maximum autonomy in decision-making in the field of security and defense. Therefore, new approaches, such as the idea of EU strategic autonomy, will be implemented only in the case if national governments agree to take steps that will provide a higher degree of political integration in security and defense, leading to European Sovereignty in defense. The evidence of the EU's transition from discussion to concrete actions is the creation of a European Defense Fund, Permanent Structured Cooperation and the launch of a Coordinated Annual Review on Defense.

The idea of creating the European Defense Union (EDU), supported by the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, has the potential to become a real one and therefore it gives new momentum to the discussions on ways to ensure global and regional (European) security. In such a context, the question arises whether the implementation of the idea of European strategic autonomy (as one of the important steps towards the creation of an EDU) could mean the end of NATO, which we have known for seventy years, or whether it symbolizes the beginning of a new model of the relationship between the EU and NATO, in which EDU will work within NATO complementing it?

In today's conditions, the European Union must strengthen its security and defense capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a global power build the resilience of its members state and protect Europe if it combines its soft power with hard power as part of the comprehensive approach.

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Стратегическая автономия Европейского Союза: на пути к «европейскому суверенитету» в обороне?

В 2019 г. исполнилось 20 лет, как государства-члены ЕС решили выработать общий подход в сфере безопасности и обороны. Авторы рассматривают вопрос о поиске новых подходов к обеспечению безопасности и обороны в Европе в современных условиях, а также формирования новой парадигмы исследований проблем обеспечения региональной безопасности в Европе. Традиционные подходы к исследованию европейской интеграции (неофункционализм и межправительственный подход) малопригодны для теоретизации развития европейской обороны в условиях новых вызовов и угроз национальной и региональной безопасности, а также нарушения трансатлантической солидарности. В статье исследуется Европейская стратегическая автономия, под которой понимается возможность Европейского Союза совместно с государствами-членами самостоятельно определять собственные приоритеты, в соответствии с которыми принимать решения и реализовывать их в сфере внешней политики, безопасности и обороны. Европейская стратегическая автономия не является синонимом независимости, как и не означает отказ от членства в военно-политических альянсах, поскольку более реалистичный сценарий предполагает ее позиционирования как европейского столба в НАТО. Реализация идеи построения «европейского суверенитета» в сфере безопасности и обороны предусматривает, что Европейский Союз должен взять на себя большую ответственность за собственную безопасность, безопасность своих соседей, а также усилить свою роль в трансатлантических отношениях, противопоставляя себя НАТО. Чтобы перейти от риторики к конкретным политическим шагам, ЕС должен разработать план мероприятий по деятельности в политическом, институциональном и промышленном измерении. Это означает, что достижение реальной автономии требует времени и совместных усилий институтов ЕС и правительств государств-членов. При этом политическая и институциональная автономия может быть построена исключительно в пределах всего Союза, тогда как

военно-промышленная автономия может быть инициирована и реализована группой наиболее экономически и технологически развитых государств-членов ЕС.

Ключевые слова: стратегическая автономия; суверенитет; оборона; политика безопасности; Глобальная стратегия ЕС; Европейский Союз; НАТО; государство-член.