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HYBRID THREATS IN THE CIVIL SECURITY SECTOR IN UKRAINE

The article focuses on hybrid threats' study in the civil security sector in Ukraine. The analysis covers the whole range of activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, taking into account the activities of National Police, National Guard, State Border Service, State Emergency Service, State Migration Service and service centers.

The study was conducted on the basis of unique empirical materials obtained - the results of questioning of MIA and CEB experts on identification and assessment of likelihood and impact of hybrid threats in civil security sector, based on the respondents' own professional experience and their expertise in identified background. The validity of the expert sample obtained is substantiated, based on the introduction of logical error detection indicators in the questionnaire.

The key areas of the study are identification, rating and ranking of hybrid threats in the field of civil security in Ukraine.

Ranking of hybrid threats was divided into four groups and ranked in each group, it was based on the expert evaluation and application of threat matrix.

Particular emphasis is placed on the most significant threats in the field of civil security, which require immediate response and development of appropriate state counteraction policies and the reduction of their risk.

It is emphasized that today it is justified to develop draft normative acts to regulate this line of activity. In this context, the Ministry of Internal Affairs has an unique structure and in addition to efforts of the central departments, coordinated communication with the CEB, whose activities are directed and coordinated by the CMU through the Minister of Internal Affairs, will ensure that, in such a condition, appropriate expertise will be created on complexity and effectiveness of counteracting hybrid threats, informing the national security's subjects of Ukraine with the information necessary for making sound management decisions in the said field.

Keywords: central organs of executive power; civil security sector; counteraction to hybrid threats; expert environment; hybrid threats; identification; ranking; system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

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Гібридні загрози у секторі цивільної безпеки в Україні
Досліджено гібридні загрози у секторі цивільної безпеки в Україні. Охоплено весь спектр напрямів діяльності Національної поліції, Національної гвардії, Державної прикордонної служби, Державної служби надзвичайних ситуацій, Державної міграційної служби та сервісних центрів.
Introduction. The issue of counteracting hybrid threats in the civil security sector is at the forefront of the MIA bodies’ activity. However, what is important about such activities’ adequacy is a fairly objective understanding of public policy implementation aimed at counteracting hybrid threats in the field.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the hybrid threats’ issue in the civil security sector, features of their identification, rating and ranking, with a focus on identifying the most significant ones that need immediate attention.

Research analysis. Today in Ukraine issues related to counteracting hybrid threats have become very relevant and are in the public spotlight. In recent years, many scientific papers have paid considerable attention to the specific problems of counteracting hybrid threats in Ukraine. In particular, issues related to the development of directions for counteracting hybrid threats have been the research subject by many well-known scientists: R. Arzumanyan [1], Z. Gbur [2], E. Magda [3], M. Malsky, V. Martyniuk [4], V. Predborsky [5], I. Rusnak [6] and others [7; 15]. However, awareness of hybrid warfare phenomenon, as well as its magnitude, requires the development of an appropriate methodology for hybrid threats’ analysis, which in turn generates a sufficient mass of knowledge to formulate a reasoned and effective government policy to counter hybrid threats.

The growth of modern society is inextricably linked to the various threats’ prevention that are exacerbated during the reform of any sphere of society [9]. The issue of counteracting hybrid threats is broad and complex enough to cover national security issues. This, above all, requires a significant analysis of the situation, an examination of those factors that cause the failure to respond...
effectively to hybrid threats, in particular in the areas of public security and civil protection. In addition, objectivity and validity of the research results require an appropriate methodological base, acceptability of the data used in the analysis, and the sources from which they come [10]. Today it is extremely important to identify the hybrid threats that realistically and most significantly affect the security situation in our society.

This task was defined by a group of experts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which included representatives of the departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, National Police of Ukraine and Central organs of Executive power (NPU, SBSU, SMSU), which during the conduct of strategic sessions and actively implementing methods of facilitation and brainstorming for identification in the field of civil security, SWOT analysis was chosen as the methodological base for further research. In our view, such a tool has become the starting point for research into the direction and basis for assessing hybrid threats and further strategic planning in the field.

In order to ensure the rating and ranking of hybrid threats (which are the most important, potential, frozen), a questionnaire was developed for the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine as a general expert population (Fig. 1). The survey was conducted in ON-LINE mode by filling in the questionnaires in compliance with the confidentiality regime and without disclosing the individual data of respondents. The aforementioned peer review reflects the respondents’ own experience and awareness of the particular subject of the survey. The sampled sample provided 4001 questionnaires. The aggregate data, among other things, also includes the selection of individual groups of respondents on the basis of belonging to the MIA body, region, age, sex and work experience in the system.

Each indicator was evaluated on two characteristics: “Probability (Assessment Level)” and “Possible Consequences (Impact)” on a 3-4-5-point scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№ з/п</th>
<th>SECTION 1. HybridthreatstoSCS – probable undesirable (negative) phenomena (actions) ofSCS</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Reduced support for Ukraine by the international community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By means of:</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1.</td>
<td>biased assessment of the situation in Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.</td>
<td>support for populist political forces in Europe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### SECTION 1. Hybrid threats to SCS – probable undesirable (negative) phenomena (actions) of SCS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№ з/п</th>
<th>Probability</th>
<th>POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| 1.4. | committing acts of abuse of sensitive historical monuments / sounding of religious objects |
| 1.5. | promotion of candidates (loyal to the aggressor country) for senior positions in international organizations (including non-governmental ones) in the field of security and human rights |

With an aim: X X X X X X X

| 1.6. | decrease in confidence in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine |
| 1.7. | reduction of international technical assistance to reform the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine |
| 1.8. | reducing the effectiveness of monitoring the security / information sphere |
| 1.9. | to evaluate the freedom of the media objectively |
| 1.10. | use of instruments of international organizations for unreasonable detention / arrest of Ukrainian citizens abroad |

| 2. | Obtaining patronage over the state through the influence of the aggressor on the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. |

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**Fig. 1. Questionnaire on the Expert Survey on Hybrid Threats in the Civil Security Sector**

It was assumed that due to large volume of the questionnaire, complexity of the questions and short time of their reflection, experts could make mistakes in the answers. Therefore, for further research, it was necessary to limit the sample to the highest quality and reliable data, i.e. to check the respondents for their logical fallacy. To this end, questionnaires were formulated in different sections, which were logically substantiated with an answer to their assessment of “probability” as
“high”. For example, «Hybrid threats are a component of hybrid war», «Unity of the Ukrainian state», etc.

Thus, in the baseline set of further analysis, there were 486 questionnaires of only those experts who provided logically agreed answers, which is 12.15%. Although 12.15% of the original sample remained after data filtering, quality of results increased significantly. This can be seen in the following example: the answers to question 39 (section 1), which is one of the biggest threats, have the following distributions in the group of those who were selected by the filter with no logical errors, compared with those who did not pass (Table 1).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logical Error Filter Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreliable Part</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As you can see, the difference in distributions is striking: 31% of unreliable experts indicated a low likelihood of being threatened, while reliable chose this option in only 3% of cases. The high probability option was chosen by them in 80% of cases. This difference is not only statistically significant (criterion \( \chi^2 = 873.5 \), \( p <0.001 \)) but also the effect size is very significant (Cramer \( V = 0.47 \), \( p <0.001 \)). Similar trends are observed in other important questions of the questionnaire.

Thus, sampling restriction based on logical error checking is statistically significant, reliable and representative.

According to preliminary analysis conducted by the MIA Expert Group, 131 hybrid threats in the civil security sector were identified, and based on expert judgment, the baseline sample provided opportunities to determine the average rating of each of the identified hybrid threats (Fig. 2).

Due to the fact that hybrid threats were evaluated on two characteristics, “likelihood” and “consequences”, further analysis to determine their rating was performed on the threat matrix basis (Fig. 3).

Based on evaluation and application of the threat matrix, the hybrid threats were ranked, divided into 4 groups and ranked in each group:

**Group 1 is the most significant threats (19).** This group includes threats that are attributed to the segments of high and medium probability matrix and potential consequences: liquidation and critical condition. These threats require immediate action to reduce the spread risk. Examples of such threats are:
### Fig. 2. Rating of Hybrid Threats in the Civil Security Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implement threats</th>
<th>Liquidation</th>
<th>Critical state</th>
<th>Severe state</th>
<th>Insignificant effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3, T19, T39</td>
<td>T4, T19.1, T44</td>
<td>T5, T27.2, T38</td>
<td>T27.4.1, T44.4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T7, T49</td>
<td>T8, T26.5, T49.1</td>
<td>T10, T27.3.5, T42</td>
<td>T44.4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T11, T27, T49.2</td>
<td>T12, T29, T42.1</td>
<td>T44.4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T13, T28</td>
<td>T14, T36</td>
<td>T21.1, T30, T42.3</td>
<td>T44.4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T15, T36.1</td>
<td>T16, T36.2</td>
<td>T21.3, T31, T42.4</td>
<td>T45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T17, T36.3</td>
<td>T18, T36.5</td>
<td>T27.1, T36.7, T44.3</td>
<td>T46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T35.12</td>
<td>T37, T44.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T19.3, T35.5, T35.11.4</td>
<td>T1, T5, T26.3</td>
<td>T35.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T20, T35.6, T35.13</td>
<td>T1.1, T21</td>
<td>T27.3.2, T35.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T24, T35.8, T35.14</td>
<td>T1.2, T21.2</td>
<td>T27.3.3, T35.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T26.6, T35.10, T35.15</td>
<td>T1.4, T21.4</td>
<td>T27.3.4, T42.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T35, T35.11, T35.16</td>
<td>T1.6, T23</td>
<td>T27.3.6, T44.4.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T35.1, T35.11.1, T35.17, T1.7, T25</td>
<td>T27.3.7, T44.4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>T35.3, T35.11.2, T35.18</td>
<td>T1.9, T26</td>
<td>T32, T44.4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T35.4, T35.11.3</td>
<td>T1.10, T26.1, T33, T34, T47</td>
<td>T48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td></td>
<td>T1.3, T1.8</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Fig. 3. Matrix of Hybrid Threats in the Civil Security Sector
- aggressor control of content in regions close to hostilities and border areas (estimate – 8.87–7.93);
- illicit trafficking in BAT (weapons, ammunition, explosives) (estimate – 8.85–8.64)
- corruption: corruption facts used in the information war (8.66–8.06), bribery and using of corrupt officials (on compromise) (8.69-8.34);
- transfer of WFD from the uncontrolled territory and the area of the OOS (assessment – 8.58–8.5);
- use of cyber operations (8.38–7.98);
- provoking separatism (8.36–9.66);
- sabotage acts on the CI (critical infrastructure) (6.83–9.21);
- activities of illegal armed groups (7.95–9.34);
- emergence of new criminal schemes in the economic sphere (7.80–7.59)
- etc. (Fig. 4).

It should be noted that each of the hybrid threats in the group requires separate analysis and identification of specific features. In particular, the survey identified a number of different manifestations of cyber operations as hybrid threats and all of them were assessed as the most dangerous hybrid threats in the civil security sector. At the same time, from the wide list of types of critical infrastructure objects, the most significant hybrid threat in the form of sabotage attack, only the warehouses, ammunition arsenals (8.09–10.02) and high-risk objects (chemically dangerous, explosive, are classified as dangerous). etc.) (7.0–10.15). However, it is noteworthy that cyber-attacks are characterized by a higher estimate of probability (8.38) of their perpetration (manifestation of this threat), and diversion to critical infrastructure is above all highly appreciated for extraordinary consequences (9.21) with a slightly lower probability of manifestation (6.83).

Fig. 4. The Most Significant Threats to the Public Security Sector

In addition, the high appreciation of hybrid threats in the form of separatism provocation (8.36–9.66) and activities of illegal armed groups (7.95–9.34) is quite
understandable. At the same time, it is of interest to be classified as the most
dangerous hybrid threats – emergence of new criminal schemes in the economic
sphere (7.80–7.59).

Such detailing may have a sufficiently deep continuation of the analysis, based on
evaluation of different law enforcement experts, different ages and work experience,
not to mention the importance of such research in regional context, focusing on
individual regions’ problems of Ukraine, and the need for such analysis is justified.

**Group 2 is a significant threat requiring top management control (64).** This

group includes threats that are attributed to the cross-sectional matrix segments:
“high probability/severe consequences”, “medium probability/critical consequences”,
“low probability/elimination”. These threats require senior management control. As
an example, this is:

– Reduction of support of Ukraine to the international community by: promotion
of candidates (loyal to the aggressor country) for leading positions in international
organizations (including non-governmental ones) in the field of security and human
rights (score – 7.15–6.4);

– injection of socio-economic tensions through economic instruments: formation
of negative attitude in the population to the service delivery system, supply of
resources through destructive activity of enterprises/suppliers, which (through the
owners) the aggressor has indirect influence (estimation – 6.7–7.1);

– activities of criminal groups aimed at deepening the criminogenic state and
destabilizing the internal socio-political situation in Ukraine (estimate – 7.09–7.42);

– purposeful activity of organized crime (individual representatives of criminal
world) in the interests of the aggressor (assessment – 6.8–7.12);

– export to the territory of Ukraine by the aggressor of representatives of
criminal world (estimate – 7.03–7.13);

– sabotage acts on OCI (Critical Infrastructure Objects): objects of life support
(estimate – 6.44–9.03), etc. (Fig. 5).

![Fig. 5. Rating of Significant Hybrid Threats in the Civil Security Sector
Requiring Top Supervision Control](image-url)
Group 3 is hybrid threats that need attention but are not of the utmost importance (36). This group includes threats that are attributed to the cross-sectional matrix segments: “high probability/low impact”, “medium probability/severe impact”, “low probability/critical impact”. These threats are not of paramount importance but need attention:
– Reduction of support of Ukraine to the international community by (5.36–6.4): biased assessment of the situation in Ukraine (6.08–6.02) and support of populist political forces in Europe (5.74–5.13);
– Committing acts of insulting sensitive historical sites / scolding religious sites (5.42–4.51);
– Reduction of support of Ukraine to the international community in order to: decrease confidence in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (5.68–6.11); reduction of international technical assistance for reforming the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (5.44–5.65); biased evaluation of the situation with media freedom (5.7–5.19) and the use of instruments of international organizations for unreasonable detention / arrest of Ukrainian citizens abroad (4.3–4.81);
– obtaining patronage over the state through the influence of the aggressor on the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (4.54–7.31);
– discredit (physical violence) of prominent figures in the country, activists of the Maidan (5.08–5.63);
– etc. (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6. Rating of Hybrid Threats in the Civil Security Sector That Need Attention But Aren’t of First Rage

Group 4 is a hybrid threat that needs tracking (2). This group includes threats that are attributed to the cross-sectional matrix segments: «medium probability/ minor effects», «low probability/ minor and critical state effects»:
– Reduced support for Ukraine by the international community by: inspiring physical attacks on diplomatic missions in Ukraine and reducing the effectiveness of monitoring the security / information sphere.
Conclusions. The analysis of hybrid threats in the civil security sector is not conclusive and requires more in-depth research using a broader array of data and information, using current methods and tools of analysis. At the same time, statistics and survey materials used by experts in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, which allowed to identify hybrid threats in the public security and civil protection sector and to determine their rankings and rankings, determine the most important that require immediate implementation of measures to reduce the risk of their occurrence.

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Гибридні угрози в секторі громадської безпеки в Україні

В статті фокусується увага на зв'язку гібридних угроз в секторі громадської безпеки в Україні. Ісследування проводилось на основі отриманих унікальних емпірічних матеріалів – результатів анкетування спеціалістів МВС і ЦОІВ по ідентифікації та оцінці вероюнності та впливу гібридних угроз в секторі громадської безпеки, оснований на собственном професійному досвіді респондентів та їх експертної освідомленості з оціненої предметі. Обосновується достовірність отриманої експертної вибірки на основі введення в опитувальник контрольних індикаторів виявлення логічної помилки. Ключовими напрямами застосування ідентифікації, ранжування та ранжування гібридних угроз в сфері громадської безпеки в Україні. На основі экспертної оценки та використання матриць угроз отримано ранжування гібридних угроз з розподіленням їх на 4 групи і проведенням рейтингу в кожній групні. Особливий акцент зроблено на гірських угрозах в сфері громадської безпеки, потребуючих безотлагального реагування та формування суперечностей з владної політики протидії та знижения ризика їх проявлення.

Ключові слова: гібридні угрози; сектор громадської безпеки; ідентифікація; ранжування; протидія гібридним угрозам; система органив МВС; експертна среда.

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